Conflict of Laws by unknown
SMU Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 2 Survey of Texas Law for the Year 1947 Article 6
1948
Conflict of Laws
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





N the case of King v. Bruce,' decided by the Texas Supreme
Court in 1947, a husband and wife, domiciled in Texas, trans-
ferred five thousand, eight hundred dollars of community prop.
erty to a New York bank. They divided the amount physically,
by cash and checks, into two parts, placing each in a separate con-
tainer. Then, pursuant to a written contract between husband and
wife, they exchanged the two containers, with the declared purpose
of converting the contents of the wife's container into her separate
property. Thereafter, the wife deposited her share in a bank in
Fort Worth, Texas, where it was immediately garnished by a
judgment creditor of the husband. The husband set up the New
York contract to defeat the garnishment.
The Court, in holding that the property was not the separate
property of the wife, and was subject to the garnishment, made
the following statement:
".... under the law of Texas. Mrs. Bruce did not acquire title to the
two thousand, nine hundred dollars, under the laws of New York in vir-
tue of the contract made there; that it was not thereby changed into
another class of property from what it was when acquired in this state
(Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S .W. 799): that it was not her
separate property when deposited in the garnishee bank. and that it
remained, after deposit, the community property of both spouses....
The segregation of the comminity was made with a view to its being
enjoyed by Mrs. Bruce in this state...
"The rule just stated does not militate against the rule, generally
speaking, that the validity of contracts is controlled by the law of the
state where made and performed. The rule of the domicile predominates
as between the spouses."' 2 (Italics supplied.)
The Court then goes on to say, in support of its decision, that
the general rule will not be,




"... observed and applied when to enforce a foreign contract accord-
ing to the provisions of foreign laws, will contravene some established
rule of public policy of the state of the forum .... 
citing Union Trust Company v. Grosman.'
Though the decision in the case obtains a result consistent with
that reached in the majority of cases involving the enforceability
of foreign contracts in a forum whose public policy is violated by
the contract,' it is submitted that the language employed by the
Court would seem to indicate a departure from the rationale of
this line of decisions.
Did the Court intend to say that the contract, though valid at
the place of making and performance, is unenforceable in Texas
because contrary to the public policy of this state, or did it intend
to announce the rule that the contract was invalid in the first
instance because, "the rule of the domicile predominates as be.
tween the spouses"? If the latter, then it would seem that a new
doctrine has been introduced into the Texas Conflict of Laws
rules.' If the former, it would appear that the decision would have
been made stronger by citing the Grosman case as in direct sup-
port of the holding, rather than inserting it somewhat parentheti-
cally, as supporting the decision indirectly, and upon an addi-
tional ground to that which actually decided the issue.
W. M. S.
a Ibid.
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5 E.g., Bondv. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1917); Griffin . McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941);
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